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The horizontal integration of the energy market and the organization of transmission services remain two open 
issues in the restructured European electricity sector. The coupling of the French, Belgian and Dutch electricity 
markets (the trilateral market) in November 2006 was a real success that the inclusion of Germany to the 
trilateral market should soon prolong. But the extension of market coupling whether in Central Western Europe 
or in other European regions encounters several difficulties and the future remains far from clear. The highly 
meshed grid of continental Europe complicates things and it is now sometimes recognized that the penetration 
of wind will further exacerbate these difficulties. The nodal system could go a long way towards solving these 
problems, but its implementation is not yet foreseen in the EU. 
This paper analyzes versions of market coupling that differ by the organization of counter- trading. While 
underplayed  in  current  discussions,  counter-trading  will  become  a  key  element  of  market  coupling  as  its 
geographic coverage expands and wind penetration develops. We consider a stylized six node example found in 
the literature and simulate market coupling for different assumptions of zonal decomposition and coordination 
of TSOs. We show that these assumptions matter: market coupling can be quite vulnerable to the particular 
situation on hand; counter-trading can work well or completely fail depending on the case and it is not clear 
beforehand what will prevail. Our analysis relies on standard economic notions such as social welfare, Nash 
and Generalized Nash equilibrium. But the use of these notions is probably novel. We also simplify matters by 
assuming away strategic behaviour. The nodal organization is the reference first best scenario: different zonal 
decompositions and degrees of coordinations are then studied with respect to this first best solution. 
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Congestion management is still an open issue in the restructured European electricity sector.
Grid congestion occurs when available infrastructure capacities, in parts of the transmission
system, constraint the energy market. Grid congestion evolves with short and long term changes
(increase and decrease) of generation and consumption and with the development of the grid
infrastructure. One can deal with congestion by resorting to an organization that clears the
energy market while remaining within infrastructure capacities: parts of the grid are congested,
but in a way that does not endanger its security. This is the case of the so-called nodal pricing
or ow-based system. The nodal system clears the energy market while simultaneously taking
into account the real possibilities of the grid: it fully integrates energy and transmission and is
thus the perfect implementation of \implicit auction" (EU parlance refers to implicit auction,
but the EU does not implement nodal pricing). The theory of the model goes back to Hogan
[20] and its rst implementation to 1998 in the PJM market. The model has since worked
successfully in several regions of the US and in New Zealand (see the country survey of Sioshansi
and Pfaenberger [29]). Due to the perfect integration of energy and transmission, Power
Exchanges (PXs) and Transmission System Operators (TSOs) form a unique entity (an ISO
in U.S. parlance) that clears both the energy and transmission markets in order to maximize
social welfare while satisfying energy balance and transmission constraints. In this market
organization, congestion costs are directly passed into the electricity prices and contribute to
dierentiate them over nodes.
Other market designs separate energy and transmission markets and consequently the action
of the of PXs and TSOs on the respective market. This is what is currently happening in Europe
where PXs organize the energy market on the basis of the \Market Coupling" rules; while
TSOs operate counter-trading in the transmission market. Market coupling organizes congestion
management on a zonal basis. This means that energy market is split in several zones controlled
by dierent PXs. These zones are linked by (possibly capacitated) inter-connectors that provide
a simplied representation of the grid. Transmission System Operators announce the capacity
of these inter-connectors capacities to PXs before the clearing of the energy market. The energy
market clears on the basis of these capacities and the resulting injections and withdrawals
are communicated back to TSOs. If the capacities announced by system operators before the
clearing are small enough compared to the real possibilities of the grid, the energy market clears
without creating congestion. If not, overows occur and TSOs will then intervene and restore
grid feasibility buying incremental or decremental power ows from consumers and generators
in order to restore the feasibility of the grid. These operations are denoted as counter-trading or
re-dispatching. Counter-trading costs that arise from the TSOs' activities are charged to users
of the grid. These represent the link between the energy and transmission markets.
Market coupling deals with spatial arbitrage between dierent markets, which is thus also
the subject of this paper (a work on inter-temporal arbitrage in a wind intensive market is
underway). The basic idea of the mechanism is depicted in Figure 1.
Consider two markets North (N) and South (S) with supply and demand bids in each of
them. Assume that there are two generators in N. Denote them as \gen1" and \gen2". Gen1
disposes of a 100 MW plant whose marginal cost is 5 e/MWh, while gen2 can at maximum run
400 MW at a marginal cost of 20 e/MWh. They have to satisfy a demand of 200 MWh. In
2Figure 1: North (N) and Southern (S) zones
market S, there are other two generators \gen3" and \gen4". Both generators have an available
capacity of 300 MW, but gen3 has a marginal cost of 20 e/MWh, while gen4 operates at a
marginal cost of 30 e/MWh. The electricity demand in S amounts to 600 MWh. Note that
generation in N is cheaper than in S.
Consider rst the equilibrium in each market taken in isolation as depicted in Figure 1. The
equilibrium price in market S is higher than the equilibrium price in market N as shown in Figure
1. This creates an arbitrage opportunity between the two markets: electricity should move from
market N to S. Suppose now that the two markets are linked by a Transfer Capacity (TC) as
depicted in Figure 2. If this transfer capacity is large enough the usual arbitrage reasoning will
imply a ow between the N and S markets that equalizes the prices in both markets: this is
shown on Figure 2a. If this transfer capacity is limited, the arbitrage will be limited to what
the TC allows (in our case 250 MWh, as illustrated in Figure 2b) and the electricity prices will
be zonal.
Figure 2: North (N) and Southern (S) zones with TC
The following section describes the successes and the failures of the application of market
coupling and counter-trading in the European energy system.
32 Market coupling in the European energy system
The coupling of the Belgian, Dutch and French electricity markets (Market Coupling or MC,
or the \trilateral market" when limited to these three countries) went live on 21 November
2006. The three countries are part of \CWE", the Central-Western Region of the European
Regional Initiative or \ERI" (see European Energy Regulators or ERGEG web site) that also
comprises Germany and Luxembourg. The coupling of these three markets was probably the
rst achievement of the ERI and became the success story of the restructuring of the European
electricity sector. Market coupling quickly led to the convergence of the prices on the power
exchanges of the trilateral market (Den Ouden [5], Dijkgraaf and Janssen [7]), which in turn
showed the eciency of \implicit auctions" (a partial integration of energy and transmission
markets) compared to so-called \explicit auctions" that fully separate energy and transmission.
Implicit auctions eventually became the preferred option for cross border trade in Regulation
No 714/2009 (European Commission [13]) which is part of the third legislative package that will
become law in March 2011. Other Market Coupling projects are now foreseen: the linkage of
Germany to the existing trilateral market in CWE should be achieved on 7 September 20101;
this should pave the way to a new phase of the coupling of both Eastern and Western Denmark
to Northern Germany (the coupling of DK East and West with Germany went to dierent
phases since its rst launching in 2008). A new MC project is also foreseen between Poland, the
Czech Republic and Austria (see EXAA [15]); last a more ambitious project aims at coupling
the Scandinavian, Spanish, Italian markets with CWE2.
But the success story has its limits. The coupling of the Danish and North German markets
initiated in October 2008 had to be interrupted after one week of operations (DERA [6]) and
was only reactivated in November 20093. A project to improve the current trilateral system in
CWE through the introduction of a better representation of the transmission system4 failed to
meet its deadline target in 2009, without clear indication of what went wrong and how one is
now trying to x the problem. The completion of the current MC in CWE by the inclusion of
Germany, now foreseen for 7 September 2010, has also been delayed a few times, again without
much explanation besides that it is \a challenging project". This will in turn require relaunching
the Danish-German coupling. Somewhat hidden behind these headlines, domestic congestion
management remains as opaque as ever: Duthaler et al. [8] use AC load ow simulations on
the UCTE area to show the important role of domestic congestion in the management of the
European grid. But companies hardly conrm. RTE's and Elia's annual reports (RTE [28],
Elia [9])) barely mention congestion. The Dutch operator seems to be much more concerned
(TenneT web site includes a whole discussion of congestion management), but these concerns are
not necessarily shared: Groeneveld speaking in the name of E.ON Benelux (see E.ON Benelux
[10]) explains that Dutch worries about congestion in the Netherlands, as studied in D-Cision
and The Brattle Group' report [3], are largely unfounded (\congestions should be incidental in
1For more details see TenneT [32] and EPEX Spot [11].
2See EPEX Spot [12].
3See ICIS Heren. 2010. News. CWE/Nordic market coupling seeks \stop-gap" measures. Available at
http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2010/03/08/9340801/cwenordic-market-coupling-seeks-stop-gap-measures.html
4See the \Memorandum of Understanding of the Pentalateral Energy Forum on Market Coupling and Security of
Supply in the Central Western Europe". Available at:
http://www.benelux.be/pdf/pdf nl/dos/dos14 PentalateralMoUMarketCouplingAndSecurityOfSupply.pdf
4nature and limited in size"). In contrast, EWIS [14] analyzes wind development in CWE and
explains that congestion will make the situation unsustainable without additional investments in
the grid. All this sounds like \d ej a vu" and reminds us of now outdated discussions in California
(well before the meltdown) and more recently in Texas (before the decision to go nodal). In
both cases local congestion and counter-trading turned out to be much more important than
initially foreseen.
Diculties with Market Coupling are hardly surprising: while the linkage of the Belgian,
Dutch and French markets is a true milestone in the lengthy progress towards an internal
European electricity market, the overall approach suers from several design aws that cannot,
but progressively materialize as one moves ahead. These diculties should not endanger the
more ambitious coupling of the Scandinavian, Spanish and Italian markets with CWE provided
the integration of CWE is successful: indeed, the radial coupling of CWE with Scandinavia
and the Iberian and Italian peninsulas should be relatively easy to handle compared to the
integration of the meshed CWE. But a zonal Market Coupling in a highly meshed system such
as the one of CWE is eectively a \challenging project" and the integration of wind power at
the level stated in EU objectives in that meshed system may indeed make the current market
design \unsustainable".
System integration is at the core of the internal electricity market. It is based on both spatial
and inter-temporal arbitrage of electricity and its nancial derivatives. The analysis conducted
in the Introduction on a two zone market can be applied to the Central Western European
electricity market. The implementation of market coupling generalizes that framework to the
current trilateral market including France (F), Belgium (B) and the Netherlands (NL) as shown
on Figure 3a, and after the coupling with Germany (G) to a four country system market (referred
to as the pentalateral market as Luxembourg has part of this system integrated both with
Germany and Belgium5) as depicted in Figure 3b.
Figure 3: Stylized representation of the Central Western European power market
The notions of arbitrage and transfer capacities introduced in Figure 2 extend as such to the
more general cases of Figure 3 as well as to the future extension to the Nordic market and the
5See again \Memorandum of Understanding of the Pentalateral Energy Forum on Market Coupling and Security
of Supply in the Central Western Europe". Available at:
http://www.benelux.be/pdf/pdf nl/dos/dos14 PentalateralMoUMarketCouplingAndSecurityOfSupply.pdf
5two Southern peninsulas. Leaving aside issues related to the representation of the characteristics
of the generators such as bloc bids (see Appendix A for a short discussion of the comparison of
the treatment of machine characteristics in US and EU systems), the question raised by market
coupling boils down to the determination of the transfer capacities linking the zonal systems
and to whether electricity transmission can really be represented by transfer capacities. The
relevance and importance of these questions is well acknowledged. Hogan in [21] quotes the
US federal electricity regulator stating that transfer capacities are articial constructs without
economic or physical reality that were inherited from the regulatory period when trade was not
a key matter. Less assertively, European Transmission System Operators cautiously advice that
they do not guarantee the validity of the transmission capacities that they publish. Last but
not least, one can observe that it is now several years that TSOs postpone the publication of
their method for computing transmission capacities. At least we know some of the principles
that they use (see Rious et al. [26] for a detailed explanation) and will invoke them later in the
discussion.
In short and barring questions of bloc bids and inter-temporal arbitrage that we do not con-
sider here, the problem of spatial arbitrage in Market Coupling concentrates on the transmission
system, whether represented by transfer capacities or otherwise, and its saturation. This is com-
monly referred to as congestion and occurs when one element of this grid is saturated because of
the transactions in the energy market. This paper therefore deals with congestion management
in market coupling. It is organized as follows. Section 3 presents a test problem that consists
of two congurations of a two-zone system such as commonly found in the papers of the Trans-
mission System Operators (see Entso papers on ENTSO-E website6). Section 4 provides further
discussion on market coupling and describes dierent possible organizations of counter-trading
to relieve congestion when it occurs. Numerical results of the nodal pricing model and the mar-
ket coupling and counter-trading problems applied to these two dierent market congurations
are respectively discussed in Sections 5, 6 and 7. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the nding of
the analysis.
3 The test problem
We analyze the economic problems raised by Market Coupling on the basis of a six node network
taken from Chao and Peck [2]. According to Stoft [30], we conduct the whole analysis on an
hourly basis or in MWh. Capacities are thus expressed in MWh and not in MW. The system is
depicted on Figure 4. Its functioning is explained in the following subsections.
3.1 The energy market
The network connects six nodes where generators and consumers are located. Power is injected
in nodes 1, 2 and 4 while withdrawals are in nodes 3, 5 and 6. Power production and consumption
economics are summarized by linear marginal costs and inverse demand functions. These are
listed in Table 1.
6http://www.entsoe.eu/index.php?id=80
6Figure 4: Six node market (Chao and Peck (1998))
Node Function Type Function
1 Marginal Cost 10+0.05q
2 Marginal Cost 15+0.05q
3 Inverse Demand 37.5-0.05q
4 Marginal Cost 42.5+0.025q
5 Inverse Demand 75-0.1q
6 Inverse Demand 80-0.1q
Table 1: Inverse demand and marginal cost functions of the 6 node market
3.2 The grid
The network contains eight lines and it is assumed to be without loss. All lines have impedances
equal to 1 except lines (1-6) and (2-5) that have impedances equal to 2. Similarly all lines have
unlimited capacities except lines (1-6) and (2-5) that respectively have capacities equal to 200
and 250 MWh. The network model is a standard representation of load ow equations through
a Power Transmission Distribution Factor (PTDF) matrix. Dening a hub node where the
market clears (here node 6), the PTDF of a certain node for a certain line is equal to the
portion of the ow injected at that node and withdrawn at the hub, which passes through that
line of the network. The PTDFs of the hub (node 6) are all zero. We are only interested in
the PTDFs involving lines (1-6) and (2-5) since these are the only ones with limited capacities.
These PTDFs are given in Table 2.
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6 (hub) 0 0
Table 2: PTDF of the 6 node market
4 Market coupling and dierent possible counter-trading
organizations
4.1 Market coupling
Consider the market in Figure 4 and split it into two zones, North and South, that are linked by
an inter-connector that may have a limited transfer capacity. We consider two decompositions
of the network into zones. The rst is depicted in Figure 5 and we denote it as the (3-3) two
zone problem. In the (3-3) conguration, North includes nodes 1, 2 and 3, while nodes 4, 5 and







Figure 5: (3-3) two zone conguration
Figure 6 depicts an alternative zonal decomposition. We refer to it as the (4-2) conguration
since the Northern zone includes four nodes (1, 2, 3 and 6), while the Southern zone only two
(4 and 5).
In both congurations, the two zones are linked by an inter-connector with a limited transfer
capacity that we set according to a method presented in Section 4.2. In the (3-3) market
organization, there is no transmission constraint inside the zones; in the (4-2) line (1-6) with
a capacity of 200 MWh is now internal to the Northern zone. Recall that the inter-connector
stands for the simplied representation of the grid with which TSOs provide PXs.
Each zone is controlled by one TSO and one PX. We assume, in line with the current
8Figure 6: (4-2) two zone conguration
implementation of Market Coupling that the PXs of the two zones clear the energy market in
a coordinated way. In these simple models where one does not consider complications such as
bloc bids, this amounts to solving a welfare maximization problem over the six nodes subject to
the sole constraints on imports/exports between the two zones, that is excluding constraints on
domestic lines in the zones (see Appendix C). As already explained in the Introduction, PXs
clear the market taking into account this simplied representation of the network. The resulting
ows may or may not be compatible with the physical characteristic of the network and then
TSOs operate counter-trading in order to eliminate overows and restore feasibility.
4.2 Computing transfer capacities: the principles
Transfer capacities are a key element of the organization of the European electricity system.
The notion is controversial: the US Federal regulator recognizes that it lacks both physical and
economic senses (Hogan [21]). European systems operators are not as armative, but they
carefully announce \Indicative Values for Net Transfer Capacities" that they further qualify as
\non-binding". The EU Directorate General for Competition seems to be the only one to rmly
believes in transfer capacities that it uses in its dierent proceedings.
System operators have so far refrained from publishing the details of their method for calcu-
lating ATC, but the overall principle is known: it is the worst case analysis of the possible ows
on the lines. We follow Rious et al. [26] description of the approach, taking advantage of the
simplistic two-zone nature of our problem and further simplifying the analysis by dropping all
considerations of N-1 security criterion. These authors rst explain that \The TSO knows only
the dierence between total generation and total load on its control area" and \he must anticipate
the nodal sharing of total generation and load to forecast the base case power ows". In other
words, the TSO must rst estimate the power ow that would exist before any cross border
trade. TSOs can only do this on the basis of their own experience with their grid. Rious et al.
[26] therefore cannot oer any suggestion on how to get the \base case power ow". We accord-
ingly set the tentative base case power ow to zero; in other words, we assume that domestic
transactions do not imply any signicant ows on the interconnections. The computation of the
ATC then boils down to the following very simple considerations. Selecting a pair of nodes, each
located in a zone, one considers an import/export between the two zones originating in one of
these nodes and ending in the other. The transfer capacity is then the maximal import/export
9that can be accommodated by the interconnections whatever the originating and ending nodes.
Consider rst the case of the (3-3) conguration. It is easy to see that the worst possible
loading of the inter-connection is obtained by exporting from node 1 and importing in node
6. The inter-connection results from the combination of lines (1-6) and (2-5). Since the ow
is asymmetric, it puts a maximal load on line (1-6) that has the smallest capacity, that is
200 MWh. A unit export from N to S will then imply a ow on line (1-6) computed as
PTDF1;(1 6)  PTDF6;(1 6) = 0:625 0 = 0:625 (see Table 2 for the PTDF values). The ATC
between the two zones is then 200/0.625 = 320 MWh. It is easy to verify that any net injection
from North to South in conguration (3-3) that is smaller than 320 MWh will be feasible for
the interconnection consisting of lines (1-6) and (2-5), at least if domestic transactions inside
the zones do not entail further loading on these lines.
Consider now the case of the (4-2) conguration. The worst possible loading of the inter-
connection is obtained by exporting from node 2 and importing in node 5. The ow put a
maximal load on line (2-5) that has capacity of 250 MWh, while the other lines composing the
inter-connection have innite capacity. A unit export from N to S implies a ow on line (2-5)
computed as PTDF2;(2 5)   PTDF5;(2 5) = 0:5 + 0:125 = 0:625. The ATC between the two
zones is then 250/0.625 = 400 MWh. Any net injection from North to South in conguration (4-
2) that is smaller than 400 MWh will be feasible for the interconnection consisting of line (2-5),
at least if domestic transactions inside the zones do not entail further loading on (2-5). Referring
to the legal denition of congestion (Article 2 Paragraph 2 in Regulation No 714/2009 (European
Commission [13]) any \international trade" lower than 320 and 400 MWh respectively will not
exceed the \capacity of the inter-connectors and of the national transmission system concerned".
This check applies to both conguration (3-3) and (4-2). As we shall see when discussing case
(4-2), things may not be as simple as soon as the impact of domestic transactions needs to be
taken on board, that is, as soon as one accounts for the \base case power ow".
4.3 Organizing counter-trading
The principle underlying the computation of transfer capacities is that a clearing of the energy
market that satises the constraints on transfer capacities should dispense of counter-trading,
at least as far as congestion on the interconnections are concerned. The implicit accompanying
principle is that counter-trading eorts should thus be restricted to removing intra-zone conges-
tions and the standard argument is that these should be minor. We abstract from this common
wisdom and argue that transmission capacities computed on the basis of the worst case analysis
unduly restrict the transmission possibilities oered to the energy market. We here introduce
dierent organizations of counter-trading approaches that we analyze in terms of their economic
implications in later sections. Recall that counter-trading always take the transactions resulting
from the clearing of the energy market by the PXs as given: it does not change the transactions
concluded on the energy market.
4.3.1 Perfectly coordinated counter-trading
We rst consider a model of perfectly coordinated counter-trading where both TSOs cooperate
in order to remove line overows at minimal cost. The associated optimization problem is
presented in Appendix E. Everything happens as if there were one global optimizer. Note that
10there is no indication in the literature that this is the way European TSOs operate. This is in
fact an ideal situation in terms of the organization of the counter-trading market.
4.3.2 Uncoordinated Counter-Trading
Except for the recent horizontal integration resulting from mergers and acquisitions (TenneT and
Elia respectively acquiring E.ON and Vattenfall grids), TSOs still operate on an independent
basis. We model this uncoordinated behaviour as a Nash equilibrium: a TSO operates taking
the actions of the other TSOs as given. This can be done under dierent assumptions: even
though the two TSOs physically share the network because of Kirchho's law, this sharing may
be organized through a market or left to non-market forces. In other words, there may be a
market trading the services of the line capacities (recall that we resort to the owgate language
and hence to line services because this is the way European TSOs are now thinking when they
go beyond transfer capacities); alternatively this market of line services may be missing. The
outcome of a market of line capacities is rather clear: there is a single price for each line capacity
that applies to each TSO. The situation is quite dierent when the market of line capacities
is missing. Both TSOs still value the services of the line capacities. But there is no market
for arbitraging valuation dierences and arriving at a single price. Valuations of line capacities
become parameters that identify particular equilibria in an incomplete market. Agent specic
valuations of a common resource is a characteristic of an incomplete market. In economic terms,
this can be modeled as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (see Debreu [4], Arrow and Debreu [1],
Rosen [27]).
From a mathematical point of view, a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) can be for-
mulated as a Quasi-Variational Inequality (QV I) problem (see Facchinei and Pang [17], Harker
[19]). This problem usually admits multiple solutions and Facchinei and Kanzow [16], Fukushima
[18] and Nabetani et al. [22] give methods for exploring the range of these solutions. Oggioni
and Smeers [24] and Oggioni et al. [25] apply that literature to the particular model of Mar-
ket Coupling with a missing market of line capacities with the view of exploring the outcome
of dierent key assumptions of market design. In Appendix F, we briey present the devel-
oped models. Specically we examine the impact of the horizontal integration of the market of
counter-trading and the possible impact of the absence of a market of line capacities. The follow-
ing introduces these dierent assumptions that we here explore in terms of their consequences
on market eciency.
Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 1 In this rst case, we assume that each TSO
has access to all counter-trading resources. This means that TSON can buy re-dispatch services
from generators and consumers located both in the Northern and Southern areas. TSOS can
do the same. Each TSO trades these counter-trading services within the network constraints,
taking the line utilization due to the other TSOs as given. In contrast with Section 4.3.1, there
is no common management of the network constraints but two separate managements, each run
by each TSO on the residual network resulting from the actions of the other TSO (the Nash
assumption). This duality of grid constraints sets the dierence between this model and that
described in Section 4.3.1. Our numerical ndings show that when both TSOs have access to all
counter-trading resources at the same price (there is a internal market for these resources), and
network characteristics are common knowledge for all TSOs, they also assign identical values to
11the congested lines and the solution of the problem is as in the coordinated case. This means
that an internal market of counter-trading resources also implies an internal market of line
capacities, irrespectively of whether one explicitly introduces this market of line services or not.
This also implies a single equilibrium solution. The mathematical interpretation of these results
is extensively explained in Oggioni et al. [25].
Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 2 Assume now that TSOs have a limited
access (upper and lower bounds) to the counter-trading resources located outside of their control
area. This suggests two outcomes. If TSOs do not hit their quota of counter-trading services
in the other jurisdictions, the preceding reasoning (see \Un-coordinated counter-trading Model
1") applies and the problem turns out to be identical to the one of Section 4.3.1. In other
words, one returns to the situation of perfect coordination whether one introduces a market of
line services or not. When instead this quota is hit, then some TSOs face a scarcity rent on
counter-trading resources with the consequences that their prices are no longer the same for the
two TSOs. The consequence, discussed in [25], is that the preceding reasoning explained in the
\Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 1" paragraph no longer applies. A partial integration of
the counter-trading resources therefore does not imply an implicit market of line services. One
thus needs to distinguish two cases depending on whether one explicitly introduces this market
or not. TSOs identically value line capacities when this market exists; they may have dierent
valuations when this market is missing; this latter case in turns leads to multiple Generalized
Nash Equilibria as a function of the dierence of line valuations by the TSOs. The mathematical
fundamentals of these outcomes are illustrated in Oggioni et al. [25].
Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 3 Un-coordinated Model 3 can be considered
as the most extreme case of our analysis. TSO can only access the counter-trading resources
of their own area while taking the actions of the other as given. The preceding reasoning of an
implicit market of line capacities does not apply by denition (see paragraph \Un-coordinated
counter-trading Model 1"). One thus needs to distinguish whether one explicitly introduces a
market of line services or not. In this latter case congested lines are priced dierently, which,
together with the segmentation of the market of re-dispatching resources, make the counter-
trading market fully un-coordinated.
4.4 Combining Market Coupling with Counter-Trading
Counter-trading has a cost that must be paid by participants to the market. This cost is passed
through the access charge to the grid in the European system. Because we do not identify the
access charge in this study we instead assume that the cost of counter-trading is passed through
a charge for accessing the PX. Market coupling therefore requires a combined action of PX and
TSOs: while PXs always solve the same problem (see Appendix C and Oggioni et al. [25] for the
mathematical formulation), the two TSOs operate counter-trading under dierent hypotheses of
coordination as presented in the previous sections. Fully solving the market coupling problem
requires nding an equilibrium between PX and TSOs whereby the cost incurred by TSOs is
properly passed to the participants to the PXs. This means solving a xed point problem
where the average re-dispatching cost that we denote as  is added to the marginal cost of the
generators. The computation of this xed point is described in Appendix D.
125 Results of the nodal pricing model
Due the ecient integration of the energy and the transmission market, we take the nodal pricing
model presented in the Introduction as reference. Results indicated in Tables 3 are obtained by
solving the welfare maximization problem presented in Appendix B and applied to the network
depicted in Figure 4.
Consumers in nodes 3, 5 and 6 require respectively 200, 300 and 300 MWh of electricity.
The consumption in nodes 5 and 6 is higher than in node 3. Note that electricity demand in
these nodes is mainly supplied by generators located in nodes 1 and 2 where power production
is cheaper (compare prices in Table 3). The global export of 400 MWh congests line (1-6) in
the positive direction7, and its marginal value becomes 40 e/MWh. The situation is globally
ecient and social welfare amounts to 23,000 e.
Demand (MWh) Generation (MWh) Prices (e/MWh)
node 1 300 25
node 2 300 30
node 3 200 27.5
node 4 200 47.5
node 5 300 45
node 6 300 50
Table 3: Demand, Generation and Power Prices of the nodal pricing model
6 Results of market coupling models
The clearing of the energy market is the rst step in the market coupling/counter-trading
approach. We here show how the available transfer capacity of the inter-connectors can be
computed and to which extend this aects the clearing of the energy market. Recall that PXs
nd the equilibrium on the energy market taking into account the available transfer capacity
that TSOs provide them.
6.1 Market coupling: Computing transfer capacities
Table 4 and 5 report results of market coupling for dierent values of available transfer capacity
(ATC) respectively computed for the (3-3) and (4-2) market congurations. Counter-trading,
if necessary, is always performed in a perfectly coordinated way (as explained in Section 4.3.1),
that is in the most ecient solution (global minimization of counter-trading costs). Both tables
give the total welfare computed in the Market Coupling (MC) problem, the congested lines, the
welfare at equilibrium when counter-trading is performed, the average re-dispatching cost and
the welfare losses computed with respect to the nodal pricing model.
7Hereafter the directions 1 to 6 and 2 to 5 are assumed to be positive.
136.1.1 Conguration (3-3)
Recalling that the cross border ow from North to South in the nodal system amounts to 400
MWh, one notes that this is also the ATC value for which line (1-6) gets congested in Market
Coupling. It is also the value leading to the smallest loss of welfare. Note that this is only
a numerical nding, we do not know of any property that would prove that an ATC equal
to the ow computed in nodal pricing is optimal for reducing welfare losses in a system like
Market Coupling. We reasoned before that the approach derived in Section 4.2, which reects
the method followed by TSOs, leads to a transmission capacity of 320 MWh. This would not
congest the interconnection lines, but would lead to a welfare loss of 1,519.167 e with respect
to the nodal pricing model. Last, we also note that an ATC of 450 MWh, which is the sum of
the capacities of the two lines, leads to a small welfare loss of 30.164 e when counter-trading
is ecient. Taking stock of these ndings, we conduct our analysis for ATC respectively equal
to 320, 400 and 450 MWh. An ATC of 320 MWh does not require counter-trading as one can
see from Table 4 and hence needs no further elaboration. ATCs of 400 and 450 MWh require
moderate counter-trading when eciently performed, that is, in a fully coordinated way. In
Section 7, we examine the impact of both perfect and imperfect counter-trading models on
these two cases.
ATC Welfare Congested Welfare Average Welfare
MC line at equilibrium Re-dispatching loss
0 12,520.833 - - - 10,479.167
50 14,145.833 - - - 8,854.167
100 15,687.500 - - - 7,312.500
150 17,145.833 - - - 5,854.167
200 18,520.833 - - - 4,479.167
250 19,812.500 - - - 3,187.500
300 21,020.833 - - - 1,979.167
320 21,480.833 - - - 1,519.167
350 22,145.833 - - - 854.167
400 23,187.500 (1-6) 22,999.268 0.2362 0.732
450 24,145.833 (1-6) 22,969.836 1.5081 30.164
550 25,812.500 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,779.499 4.0669 220.501
850 28,437.500 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,992.370 6.5130 7.630
1 28,437.500 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,992.370 6.5130 7.630
Table 4: Market coupling process of conguration (3-3) under dierent transmission capacity sce-
narios
6.1.2 Conguration (4-2)
One shall observe that, dierently from conguration (3-3), line (1-6) is always congested even
when the transfer capacity between the two zones is zero. Note also that line (1-6) is now
domestic (inside the Northern zone) and hence not accounted for in the coupling between the
14two zones. The most striking phenomenon is that the interconnection, which now only consists
of line (2-5) becomes congested for an ATC higher than 39 MWh, notwithstanding the fact that
we found an ATC of 400 MWh for conguration (4-2) as indicated in Section 4.2. The situation
can be explained as follows: recall from that section that Rious et al. [26] explain that \The
TSO knows only the dierence between total generation and total load on its control area" and
\must anticipate the nodal sharing of total generation and load to forecast the base case power
ows". In the absence of ex ante knowledge on this base case power ow, we assumed it to be
zero. Simulation reveals that it can eectively be quite high. As an example, the analysis of the
50 ATC case reveals injections of 400, 300 and 220 MWh in nodes 1, 2 and 4 with withdrawals
of 150, 270 and 500 MWh at nodes 3, 5 and 6. Because node 6 is now in the Northern zone, this
means that domestic transactions in that zone imply a \base case power ow" of 350 on line
(2-5) leaving only 50 MWh for import/export. This reveals the diculty of computing reliable
ATC: TSOs must gure out the impact of domestic transactions in all zones on interconnection
lines in order to determine the \base case power ow" that underlies the computation of the
ATC. This may explain that published ATCs are \indicative" and \non binding". Last, another
remarkable result is that the \welfare at equilibrium" remains quite close to the 23,000 e found
with nodal pricing as soon as the transfer capacity is equal to or exceeds 100 MWh. These
patterns are quite at variance with those obtained in conguration (3-3) suggesting that the
decomposition of the market into zones in non nodal systems can have somewhat unpredictable
eects.
ATC Welfare Congested Welfare Average Welfare
MC line at equilibrium Re-dispatching loss
0 23,519.643 (1-6) 22,769.215 0.8146 230.795
39 24,262.426 (1-6) 22,868.604 1.5434 131.396
50 24,462.500 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,891.642 1.7493 108.358
100 25,319.643 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,968.489 2.6877 31.511
150 26,091.071 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,999.423 3.6309 0.557
200 26,776.786 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,983.749 4.5802 16.251
250 27,376.786 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,920.922 5.5375 79.078
300 27,891.071 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,921.889 6.2652 78.111
350 28,294.643 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,980.697 6.5108 19.303
400 28,437.500 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,992.370 6.5130 7.630
450 28,437.500 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,992.370 6.5130 7.630
1 28,437.500 (1-6) and (2-5) 22,992.370 6.5130 7.630
Table 5: Market coupling process of conguration (4-2) under dierent transmission capacity sce-
narios
156.2 Market coupling: clearing the energy market
6.2.1 Conguration (3-3)
Before examining the impact of imperfect coordination in the 400 and 450 MWh ATC cases,
we rst report additional results of the clearance of the energy market before congestion man-
agement. Consider rst the case where the ATC is 400 MWh. The clearance of the energy
market leads to a social welfare of 23,187.500 e (see Table 4). Generation in the Northern
zone exceeds local consumption and 400 MWh are exported to the South. This saturates the
zonal interconnection that takes a marginal value of 20 e/MWh. Because of congestion, the
electricity price in the North is 27.50 e/MWh and 47.50 e/MWh in the South.
The situation is similar for an ATC of 450 MWh. Social welfare raises to 24,145.833 e (see
Table 4). The Northern export to the South of 450 MWh congests the inter-connector whose
marginal value becomes 18.333 e/MWh. This implies zonal electricity prices of 28.333 e/MWh
and 46.667 e/MWh respectively in the Northern and in the Southern zones.
6.2.2 Conguration (4-2)
Reasoning as for the (3-3) zonal decomposition, we consider dierent values of the available
North-South transmission capacity for the (4-2) conguration. As shown in Table 5 an ATC of
39 MWh is a natural reference: it does not congest line (2-5) and hence does not require cross
border counter-trading (but it still requires \domestic" counter-trading to relieve congestion on
line (1-6)). We also consider ATCs of 150 and 200 MWh, the rst one giving the smallest welfare
loss compared to nodal pricing; the second one corresponding to the use of line (2-5) (here the
ATC between the two zones) in the nodal system. Last, we look at an ATC of 400 MWh whose
results are identical to the case with innite transfer capacity obtained by adding the capacities
of the three lines ((2-5), (6-4), (6-5)) linking the Northern and Southern zones (see Table 5). We
justify working with a high value of the transfer capacity by reference because, as we will see in
the following, an ATC in excess of the ow found in the nodal solution increases counter-trading
and degrades welfare. An innite ATC is clearly the most extreme assumption. Recall that in
contrast with the (3-3) conguration, all the situations in Table 5 imply domestic congestion of
line (1-6).
The clearing of the energy market, that is before counter-trading, leads to the following
gures. For an ATC of 39 MWh, welfare before re-dispatch amounts to 24,262.426 e (see column
\Welfare MC" in Table 5). Northern zone exports 39 MWh to the South; the interconnection is
congested and electricity prices are equal to 29.843 e/MWh in the North and 48.220 e/MWh
in the South. Welfare before re-dispatch amounts to 26,091.071 e when the ATC is 150 MWh,
with electricity prices respectively equal to 31.429 and 46.000 e/MWh in the Northern and
Southern regions. The evolution towards higher welfare and trade increase when the ATC is
200 MWh: welfare before re-dispatch is now 26,776.786 e with electricity prices respectively
equal to 32.143 and 45.000 e/MWh in the North and South. Last, we observe that there is
no congestion of the interconnection when the ATC is equal to or higher than 400 MWh. The
Northern zone exports 400 MWh to the South; electricity price is equal to 35 e/MWh in both
zones and welfare before re-dispatch is 28,437.500 e.
167 Results of counter-trading models
We now discuss how re-dispatching costs and the dierent degrees of coordination between
the two TSOs modify these values and present the results of the combined action of PXs and
TSOs along the lines discussed in Section 4.4. In particular, we analyze the results of the three
counter-trading organizations under the assumptions that re-dispatching resources are provided
by both producers and consumers (\Prod/Cons") or by producers only (\Prod"). Tables report
welfare losses that are all computed with respect to the level of nodal pricing (see Section 5);
total and average re-dispatching costs respectively indicated by \TRC" and \ARC", net welfare




Table 6 compares the results of an ecient (integrated) counter-trading model. We report
results for ATCs of 400 and 450 MWh.
ATC=400 ATC=450
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) 0.74 64.76 30.16 124.65
TRC (e) 187.50 250.95 1,145.83 1,234.95
ARC (e/MWh) 0.2362 0.32 1.508 1.633
Net welfare (e) 22,999.26 22,935.24 22,969.84 22,875.35
MV line (1-6) (e/MWh) 40.00 40.61 40.00 42.22
MV line (2-5) (e/MWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 6: Results of the coordinated counter-trading Model 1 under 400 and 450 MWh ATC scenarios
for conguration (3-3)
Table 6 shows that welfare losses and re-dispatching costs are lower when both producers
and consumers contribute to counter-trading. This is intuitively reasonable. Counter-trading on
both producers and consumers for an ATC of 400 MWh minimizes the welfare loss compared to
nodal pricing. This amounts to 0.74 e, leading to a net welfare of 22,999.26 e. The re-dispatched
energy is 0.0000100 MWh with an average counter-trading cost of 0.2362 e/MWh. Line (1-6)
is still congested in the direction North-South and its marginal value remains 40 e/MWh.
This suggests (but does not prove) that a good adjustment of the available transfer capacity
in market coupling may reduce overows and hence re-dispatching needs without sacricing
much on welfare. When the re-dispatch is only conducted on producers (see the third column of
Table 6), welfare losses and re-dispatching costs both increase. The corresponding re-dispatched
electricity is around 6 MWh, still considerably lower than in the 450 MWh ATC scenarios where
it amounts to 50 MWh and 55.55 MWh respectively in the \Prod/Cons" and the \Prod" cases.
This degradation of eciency for a higher ATC is also reected in the re-dispatching costs that,
in average, respectively reach the value of 1.508 e/MWh and 1.633 e/MWh as well as in welfare
17losses and net welfares. Netting out counter-trading ows, line (1-6) remains congested in the
North-South direction with ows from the energy market in that direction and counter-trading
ows in the opposite direction. As expected the marginal value of this line capacity is higher in
the \Prod" than in the \Prod/Cons" case.
7.1.2 Conguration (4-2)
Table 7 reports the results of the \Prod/Cons" and the \Prod" cases for the two extreme values
of the ATC for conguration (4-2).
ATC=39 ATC=400
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) 131.40 2,453.01 7.84 2,320.15
TRC (e) 1,363.88 3,485.51 5,078.98 7,065.17
ARC (e/MWh) 1.54 4.28 6.51 9.56
Net welfare (e) 22,868.60 20,546.99 22,992.16 20,679.85
MV line (1-6) (e/MWh) 40.00 52.96 40.00 57.05
MV line (2-5) (e/MWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 7: Results of the coordinated counter-trading Model 1 under the 39 and 400 MWh ATC
scenarios for conguration (4-2)
Compared to the (3-3) conguration, the (4-2) market organization implies both higher re-
dispatching costs and higher net welfare when TSOs can access both production and demand
resources. As in the (3-3) case, limiting these resources to the sole generators increases counter-
trading costs and reduces net welfare. Also expected, counter-trading costs increase with the
interconnection capacity. This is particularly evident in the \Prod" scenario with a transmission
capacity of 400 MWh8, where the average re-dispatching cost is 9.557 e/MWh and the marginal
costs of congested line (1-6) reaches 57.05 e/MWh.
Table 8 reports results for the intermediate ATC values. They are mostly unsurprising in
the sense that they lie between those found in the two extreme cases. As already seen and in
contrast with the conguration (3-3), assuming an ATC equal to the ows found in the nodal
system no longer maximizes net welfare, which is now optimized for an ATC equal to 150 MWh.
Consider now the average re-dispatching cost computed for this ATC of 150 MWh. It is still
relatively high, particularly so when counter-trading resources are limited to producers. An
incentive regulation that induces TSOs to reduce counter-trading costs would also induce them
to rst limit transfer capacity in order to reduce counter-trading costs. This would lead to a
suboptimal ATC and hence to a welfare decrease.
7.2 Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 1
Suppose rst that TSON and TSOS can access to all counter-trading resources in both zones.
Recall that we referred to this case as an internal market of counter-trading resources and, as
8Recall that this also corresponds to the case with innite capacity. See Table 5.
18ATC=150 ATC=200
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) 0.57 2,447.13 16.25 2,586.782
TRC (e) 2,925.99 4,952.85 3,529.33 5,535.00
ARC (e/MWh) 3.63 6.83 4.58 8.12
Net welfare (e) 22,999.42 20,552.87 22,983.90 20,413.22
MV line (1-6) (e/MWh) 40.00 54.134 40.00 54.650
MV line (2-5) (e/MWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 8: Results of the coordinated counter-trading Model 1 under the 150 and 200 MWh ATC
scenarios for conguration (4-2)
explained in Section 4.3.2, that an internal market of counter-trading resources also implies an
internal market of line capacities (see the paragraph \Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 1"
of Section 4.3.2). Numerical results conrm this reasoning in the sense that we eectively fall
back on the solution of the optimized (coordinated) counter-trading problem (see Section 7.1).
This holds for both market congurations. Numerically, this case amounts to an allocation of
the counter-trading actions obtained in the coordinated counter-trading case between the two
TSOs. This allocation is arbitrary as dierent sharing of the counter-trading ows between the
two TSOs give the same total re-dispatching cost.
7.3 Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 2
Suppose that we now restrict the access of TSON and TSOS to counter-trading resources in
non-domestic jurisdictions and impose the re-dispatching limits indicated in Table 9 respectively


















72.478 22.478 94.957 94.957 34.978 59.978
Table 9: Limits on TSOs' actions in the (3-3) and (4-2) congurations
quantities obtained in the respective coordinated counter-trading model when the available
transmission capacity is set at 450 MWh9.
We successively treat the case where there is a market of line capacity and the case where
this market is missing.
9In both congurations, we choose the results of the 450 MWh ATC case with coordinated counter-trading to
compute the re-dispatching limits. Note that in the (4-2) conguration the results of this ATC case are identical to
those of 400 MWh up to innite ATC scenarios when counter-trading is coordinately performed.
197.3.1 Conguration (3-3)
We still consider the \Prod/Cons" and \Prod" cases that we analyze for both the 400 and 450
MWh ATC values.
A market of line capacity Suppose rst that there is a market of line capacity as discussed
in the paragraph \Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 2" of Section 4.3.2. Each line has a
single price seen by both TSON and TSOS. We nd that neither the upper nor the lower bounds
on the TSOs' actions in the other zones are binding with the result that the solution to the
problem is still identical to the one of Table 6 in Section 7.1.1, where both TSOs operate in a
coordinated way.
No market of line capacity The situation changes when the market of line capacity is
missing. We explained in the paragraph \Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 2" of Section
4.3.2 that this creates an incomplete market that can have dierent equilibria depending on the
implicit valuation of the lines by the two TSOs. Assume, as illustration, that TSON values line
(1-6) higher than TSOS by an amount of 60 e/MWh. Results in the two ATC scenarios are
reported in Table 10.
ATC=400 ATC=450
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) 236.18 276.66 396.30 493.90
TRC (e) 420.01 459.75 1,489.59 1,580.12
ARC (e/MWh) 0.53 0.59 1.995 2.126
Net welfare (e) 22,763.82 22,723.34 22,603.70 22,506.10
MV line (1-6) TSON (e/MWh) 69.45 71.52 82.67 87.68
MV line (2-5) TSON (e/MWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MV line (1-6) TSOS (e/MWh) 9.45 11.52 22.67 27.68
MV line (2-5) TSOS (e/MWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 10: Results of the un-coordinated counter-trading Model 2 with conguration (3-3) when
ATCs equal 400 and 450 MWh and the (1-6) line wedge is 60 e/MWh
Note that line (1-6) is still congested in the direction North-South with line marginal values
now depending on the TSO (TSON and TSOS seeing values of 69.45 e/MWh and 9.45 e/MWh
for line (1-6) respectively). In the 400 MWh ATC scenario, re-dispatch amounts to 14 MWh
and 10 MWh respectively in the \Prod/Cons" and in the \Prod" cases; when the ATC is 450
MWh, re-dispatched quantities are respectively of 30 MWh and 35.10 MWh. Again ineciency
increases when the ATC is selected too high. Comparing Tables 10 and 6, we observe that
counter-trading costs increase compared to the coordinated counter-trading model both in the
\Prod/Cons" and in the \Prod" cases. This implies a decrease of the net welfare.
207.3.2 Conguration (4-2)
A market of line capacity Both TSOs see the same prices for the congested lines. We
here have dierent situations. As in the (3-3) organization, all results of the 39 MWh and the
results of the Prod/Cons 400 MWh ATC extreme cases are identical to those of the perfectly
coordinated counter-trading model (see Table 7 for the respective values). The reason is that
the restrictions to access in the other jurisdiction are not binding.
The situation changes when the ATC is 400 MWh and re-dispatch is limited to producers:
the problem becomes infeasible meaning that counter-trading is impossible because of lack of
resources! This situation has been encountered in practice. TSOs have a strong and obvious
incentive to avoid that outcome, something that they can do by reducing the ATC oered to the
energy market. This is what the Swedish TSO is reputed to have done (Norwegian Electricity
Association [23]).
Table 11 reports the results for the intermediate ATC of 150 and 200 MWh. These are
again intermediate compared to those of the extreme cases, but with some interesting features.
The 150 MWh ATC with access to both producers and consumers is again extremely ecient
and identical to that of the perfectly coordinated counter-trading scenario (compare Tables 11
and 8). But the degradation is severe when counter-trading resources are limited to producers.
When increasing the ATC to 200 MWh (again going beyond the optimal 150 MWh), there is a
slight degradation (still identical to that of the perfectly coordinated counter-trading scenario)
in the Prod/Cons case that becomes dramatic when counter-trading is limited to producers as
the problem is infeasible again!
ATC=150 ATC=200
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) 0.57 3,010.42 16.25 infeasible
TRC (e) 2,925.99 5,373.05 3,529.33 infeasible
ARC (e/MWh) 3.63 7.61 4.58 infeasible
Net welfare (e) 22,999.42 19,989.58 22,983.90 infeasible
MV line (1-6) (e/MWh) 40.00 54.13 132.57 infeasible
MV line (2-5) (e/MWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 infeasible
Table 11: Results of the un-coordinated counter-trading Model 2 with conguration (4-2) when
ATCs equal 150 and 200 MWh and the (1-6) line wedge is 0 e/MWh
No market of line capacity Table 12 gives the results for the two extreme ATC values.
We rst observe that limiting counter-trading to producers remains infeasible when the ATC is
400 MWh. This is not surprising: eliminating the market of line capacity cannot help counter-
trading; what was not possible with a market of line capacity remains impossible without it.
Other elements of Table 12 are more unusual and deserve additional interpretation. The table
shows a column where there is \No equilibrium". In order to understand this situation, recall
that both TSOs always warrant a zero value for line (2-5) with or without capacity market. But
line (1-6) is always congested and hence susceptible of dierent valuations by the TSOs. This
21has implications that we now discuss.
ATC=39 ATC=400
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) No equilibrium 2,798.54 2,472.40 infeasible
TRC (e) No equilibrium 3,783.14 7,190.99 infeasible
ARC (e/MWh) No equilibrium 4.703 9.764 infeasible
Net welfare (e) No equilibrium 20,201.46 20,527.60 infeasible
MV line (1-6) TSON (e/MWh) No equilibrium. 118.38 78.16 infeasible
MV line (2-5) TSON (e/MWh) No equilibrium 0.00 0.00 infeasible
MV line (1-6) TSOS (e/MWh) No equilibrium 58.38 18.16 infeasible
MV line (2-5) TSOS (e/MWh) No equilibrium 0.00 0.00 infeasible
Table 12: Results of the un-coordinated counter-trading Model 2 with conguration (4-2) when
ATCs equal 39 and 400 MWh and the (1-6) line wedge is 60 e/MWh
The missing market of line capacity has a particularly realistic interpretation in this (4-
2) conguration. Line (1-6) is now a congested domestic line in the Northern zone. Market
coupling does not foresee today any cooperation mechanism for the two TSOs to remove this
congestion. A possible approach would be to include line (1-6) in an internal market of line
capacity. TSOs have indeed realized the importance of the problem and the potential of this
approach; in TenneT [31], they envisage including so-called \critical infrastructures" (in former
US parlance \commercially signicant owgates") in their ow-based model. At this stage, this
has not been implemented.
ATC=150 ATC=200
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) No equilibrium 3,010.08 1,028.40 infeasible
TRC (e) No equilibrium 5,373.18 4,364.02 infeasible
ARC (e/MWh) No equilibrium 7.61 5.92 infeasible
Net welfare (e) No equilibrium 19,989.92 21,971.61 infeasible
MV line (1-6) TSON (e/MWh) No equilibrium 132.60 62.07 infeasible
MV line (2-5) TSON (e/MWh) No equilibrium 0.00 0.000 infeasible
MV line (1-6) TSOS (e/MWh) No equilibrium 72.60 2.07 infeasible
MV line (2-5) TSOS (e/MWh) No equilibrium 0.00 0.000 infeasible
Table 13: Results of the un-coordinated counter-trading Model 2 with conguration (4-2) when
ATCs equal 150 and 200 MWh and the (1-6) line wedge is 60 e/MWh
A wedge between the valuations of line (1-6) by the two TSOs reects the lack of attention of
some TSOs (in this case the Southern TSO) for a domestic congested infrastructure in another
jurisdiction (here the Northern zone) in a zonal system. We computed the equilibrium when
this wedge is zero for line (1-6) in the previous paragraph. We now consider non zero wedges
22for the valuation of line (1-6), for which we test values 30 e/MWh and 60 e/MWh.
Assuming dierent valuations of line (1-6) can dramatically aect results for the very mod-
erate 39 ATC threshold (see Table 12) as well as for the optimal (in terms of welfare deduction)
150 MWh case (Table 13). Specically, there is no equilibrium in the \Prod/Cons" case for a
wedge of 60 e/MWh and these two ATC values. In contrast, there is an equilibrium for a wedge
of 30 e/MWh (given in Table 14).
Because we found an equilibrium for a zero wedge in the preceding paragraph, one can show
that there is a whole range of equilibria for wedges between 0 and 30 e/MWh. Additional
equilibria also exist for wedges higher than 30 e/MWh, but the situation suddenly turns to non
existence of the equilibrium somewhere below 60 e/MWh. We are thus in the embarrassing
situation where the market can end-up in any of several equilibria or not nd an equilibrium at
all. It all depends on the dierent valuations of a domestic congested line by two TSOs that,
under the current market design, have no incentive to jointly work to remove that congestion.
This signals a badly posed problem or, in other terms, a awed market design. Possibly adding
to the confusion, we nd an equilibrium when counter-trading resources are limited to the
producers, whether the wedge is 60 or 30 e/MWh.
ATC=39 ATC=150
Prod/Cons Prod/Cons
Welfare loss (e) 172,45 560.40
TRC (e) 1,403.29 3,414.89
ARC (e/MWh) 1.59 4.33
Net welfare (e) 22,827.55 22,439.60
MV line (1-6) TSON (e/MWh) 44.61 56.32
MV line (2-5) TSON (e/MWh) 0.00 0.00
MV line (1-6) TSOS (e/MWh) 14.61 26.32
MV line (2-5) TSOS (e/MWh) 0.00 0.00
Table 14: Results of the un-coordinated counter-trading Model 2 with conguration (4-2) when
ATCs equal 39 and 150 MWh and the (1-6) line wedge is 30 e/MWh
The tables also show that there is always an equilibrium for these two wedges for the higher
ATCs of 200 and 400 MWh when the problem is feasible (sucient counter-trading resources).
These look like chaotic results and that is what they probably are! But this should not come
as a surprise: a missing market of line capacity is a market failure that economics tell us very
little about: we are in unexplored waters and many things can indeed happen. Last, note that
the tables also show that equilibria, when they exist, can become quite inecient as a result of
both the restriction of counter-trading resources and the missing transmission market. Existing
equilibria are indeed associated with dramatic welfare decreases.
This analysis suggests an important policy conclusion. An integrated market of counter-
trading resources implicitly creates a market of line capacities (in the same way as a nodal
energy market creates a transmission market). This ensures an ecient counter-trading. That
property can be lost when the market of counter-trading is only partially integrated. It is then
important to explicitly create a market of line capacities in order to complete the market and
23avoid it to become at best inecient, at worst erratic and ambiguous. As argued before, the
principle is that this should not be too dicult: even if one reasons that nodal pricing is too
complicated for traders on the energy market, this argument should not apply to TSO that by
nature should master the technology and economics of the grid.
7.4 Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 3
The un-coordinated counter-trading Model 3 describes an extreme case where TSON and
TSOS manage congestion by only procuring counter-trading resources in their own jurisdic-
tion. The market of counter-trading resources is thus entirely segmented. This means that the
re-dispatched quantities sum up to zero inside of each zone. As is now standard, we successively
consider the cases where there is a market of line capacity and when this market is missing for
both (3-3) and (4-2) congurations.
7.4.1 Conguration (3-3)
A market of line capacity Table 15 gives the results of this case where by construction,
both TSOs see the same price for the lines. The 450 MWh ATC scenario reveals a highly
inecient counter-trading. In contrast, ineciency is again minimal when the ATC is optimally
determined at 400 MWh. The results are thus quite sensitive to the choice of the ATC (recall
that the ATC is an ill-dened notion and hence the choice of a good value is controversial). In
both cases, re-dispatching costs are higher when counter-trading is applied only to producers.
ATC=400 ATC=450
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) 0.37 95.40 1,454.21 3,095.56
TRC (e) 187.13 281.25 2,441.56 3,781.25
ARC (e/MWh) 0.2358 0.3557 3.448 5.878
Net welfare (e) 22,999.63 22,904.60 21,545.79 19,904.44
MV line (1-6) (e/MWh) 40.00 60.00 146.67 220.00
MV line (2-5) (e/MWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 15: Results of the un-coordinated counter-trading Model 3 with conguration (3-3) when
ATCs equal 400 and 450 MWh and the (1-6) line wedge is 0 e/MWh
No market of line capacity Table 16 gives the results when we again assume that the
prices of line (1-6) seen by the two TSOs dier by 60 e/MWh. For both \Prod" cases, results are
identical to those of Table 15, except for the marginal values of line (1-6). In the \Prod/Cons"
scenarios, instead, market incompleteness degrades the situation leading to a reduction of social
welfare with respect to the corresponding cases with a market for line capacities (compare Table
15).
24ATC=400 ATC=450
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) 94.57 95.40 1,554.62 3,095.56
TRC (e) 280.41 281.25 2,528.64 3,781.25
ARC (e/MWh) 0.3547 0.3557 3.591 5.878
Net welfare (e) 22,905.43 22,904.60 21,445.38 19,904.44
MV line (1-6) TSON (e/MWh) 60.0000051 60.0000001 166.67 220.000
MV line (2-5) TSON (e/MWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MV line (1-6) TSOS (e/MWh) 0.0000051 0.0000001 106.67 160.00
MV line (2-5) TSOS (e/MWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 16: Results of the un-coordinated counter-trading Model 3 with conguration (3-3) when
ATCs equal 400 and 450 MWh and the (1-6) line wedge is 60 e/MWh
7.4.2 Conguration (4-2)
We report the tables of this scenario in Appendix G.
A market of line capacity Results are not fundamentally surprising. The limitation of
counter-trading resources to the sole producers makes counter-trading impossible because of
lack of resources. When resources are sucient as in the \Prod/Cons" cases, their restriction
to the sole domestic zone entails drastic welfare decreases compared to the nodal pricing model.
Average re-dispatching costs are also quite high for high ATC with the already mentioned result
that an incentive regulation would in fact induce TSOs to restrict the ATC to 39 MWh in order
to reduce re-dispatching costs to 1.868 e/MWh and appear more ecient (see Tables 17 and
18 in Appendix G).
No market of line capacity The combination of the segmentation of the counter-trading
resources and the absence of a transmission market makes the situation very unstable as one
oscillates between \no equilibrium" and \infeasible", with some cases of inecient equilibria.
The interpretation of these situations derives from explanations given above and will not be
repeated here. We report the results in Tables 19 and 20 in Appendix G.
8 Conclusion
This paper only oers an illustrative analysis. The discussion is conducted on a simple six
node example taken from the literature. This six node market is split into two zone systems of
which we consider two versions. They both take the form of a North-South decomposition to
which we refer as the (3-3) and (4-2) congurations (the rst and second gures are respectively
the number of nodes in the \Northern" and \Southern" zones). We then look at dierent
organizations of cross border trade in these two congurations. Even with this simple set up we
nd interesting phenomena.
25We rst apply nodal pricing that we take as the rst best, reference, solution with respect
to which we measure welfare losses of other organizations. By denition, nodal pricing gives
the same results for the two zonal congurations and maximizes welfare. This is well known
and needs no additional comment. Various considerations have hampered the introduction of
nodal pricing so far in Europe and the so-called Market Coupling organization is currently the
state of the art. This architecture relies on a partial integration of the energy and transmission
markets. Energy clears on the basis of a simplied representation of the grid that currently
relies on \transfer capacities", but should move to a \ow-based" (owgate in US parlance)
type approach where the grid is represented by a set of \critical infrastructures". Whatever
the nal description of the grid, the inevitable simplications for representing it may require
counter-trading in order to match the clearing of the energy market with the real capacities of
the grid. The Regulation 714/2009 [13] requires TSOs to maximize transmission capacities. This
obligation is not implementable in general because increasing the transmission capacity between
two zones in a meshed grid may at the same time reduce transmission capacity between two other
zones. The example used in this paper bypasses this logical impossibility by addressing a simpler
two zone system for which it is then eectively possible to \maximize" the transfer capacity.
Even with this restriction, the exercise reveals that Market Coupling still raises questions.
Counter-trading has a cost that it is reasonable to try to minimize. Integration of counter-
trading operations achieves that result. We thus take, as second best solution, a Market Coupling
organization where possible overows resulting from the energy market are eliminated by an
ecient, minimal cost, counter-trading. This happens when all TSOs operate in a coordinated
way. Because it is impossible to nd the transfer capacity between two zones in a univocal way,
we conduct the analysis by assuming dierent ATC values. A rst nding is that the outcome
of this second best solution is quite sensible to the zonal decomposition. Welfare losses, as a
function of the ATC, show quite dierent evolutions in the two zonal congurations (3-3) and
(4-2). They can be important in the (3-3) conguration while they always remain modest in
the (4-2) arrangement. We also nd that, barring strategic behaviours, it may be possible for
the second best to get close to the rst best provided we nd the \right" ATC and sucient
counter-trading resources are available. But we have no clue to oer on the nding of this right
value. One possible idea would be to try to take advantage of nodal simulations to do so. We
indeed nd that an ATC of 400 MWh that is the export from North to South in the nodal
pricing system minimizes welfare losses in the second best organization of conguration (3-3).
But this nding does not carry through to the (4-2) conguration, where an ATC of 150 MWh
(and then lower than nodal line use) minimizes welfare losses!! Recalling how simplistic our six
node network is, we conclude that it will be very very dicult in general to derive ATCs from
simulations of optimal dispatch. In short, the second best can get us quite close to the rst best,
but this depends on nding the right ATC that remains an unsolved (or most likely unsolvable)
problem.
Suppose however that welfare loss minimizing ATC has been properly dened in the sense
that an integrated counter-trading minimizes welfare losses compared to nodal pricing. We
have seen that the corresponding ATC are 400 and 150 MWh respectively in the (3-3) and
(4-2) congurations. An important question is how it will be possible to achieve this integrated
counter-trading. Numerical experiments conrm previous methodological derivations that show
that this may not require the horizontal integration of the TSOs (even though this is probably
26the most ecient solution). We observe that the creation of an internal market of counter-
trading resources is a perfect substitute for the horizontal integration of TSOs: the arbitrage
taking place through access to these resources results in the same counter-trading operations
as the integrated TSOs. Needless to say the broader the access to counter-trading resources,
the better the result: limiting counter-trading resources to producers impairs eciency. But
whatever the extent of the counter-trading resources, making them available through an internal
market has a dramatic benecial impact on eciency.
Experience has shown that implementing an internal market, whether for energy or ancillary
services such as reserve or balancing is dicult in European electricity market. The same
is likely to be true for counter-trading resources as some TSOs may want to reserve some
resources for their own actions. This is where the vulnerability of market coupling to variations
of market design shows up. We consider two dierent features of market design on which we
conduct numerical experiments. One is the extent of access by one TSO to counter-trading
resources in the other jurisdiction. This is a particular case of the more general question of
horizontal integration of ancillary resources such as reserves or balancing in Europe. Specically
we consider both partial and no access to resources in the other jurisdiction. The other market
design feature is the existence of a market of line capacity at the counter-trading level that deals
with the real characteristics of the grid. One argument used for justifying market coupling is to
simplify the intricacies of the grid for energy traders; this argument obviously does not apply
for TSO that should be conversant with grid technology and economics and hence able to deal
with a complete transmission market. We thus consider two scenarios that dier by whether a
market of line capacity exists or not.
Assume rst a market of line capacity and consider the case of a restricted internal market of
counter-trading resources. The results are as expected and (methodologically) reassuring: the
more one restricts access to counter-trading resources in the other jurisdiction (from partial to
no access) the more inecient the system becomes and the higher the incurred welfare losses. It
may even be impossible to counter-trade, something that has indeed been observed in practice.
This may have a very counter productive eect on the \maximization" of transmission capacities.
TSOs that face the impossibility to counter-trade because of insucient resources or are subject
to an incentive regulation to reduce counter-trading costs will be induced to restrict ATC. This
has also been observed in practice. The basic recommendation coming from these numerical
experiments is thus straightforward: one should have an integrated market of counter-trading
resources. One even observes that a full horizontal integration of these resources allow one to
reestablish the second best eciency (albeit probably at higher transaction costs).
The situation is quite dierent when there is no market of line capacity. The market begins
to behave in a chaotic way and this is also not surprising: a missing market of line capacity
is a market failure, the outcome of which is largely unknown. We observe both a possible
lack of equilibria and a multiplicity of equilibria; these signal a bad market design. When
equilibria exist, they are accompanied by further degradations of welfare, which also signal a
very inecient market design. Needless to say, all this can be compounded by the restricted
access to counter-trading resources.
All this analysis can be summarized in a simple recommendation: if one persists in not
installing a proper transmission market at the energy level, at least one should install it at the
counter-trading level. The compound of inadequate ATC computations and inecient counter-
27trading can create havoc in the market.
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A Non convexities in generation systems
The discussion in the paper is conducted assuming increasing marginal costs of generation
stations and decreasing linear demand functions. These are standard economic assumptions.
Reality diers from this convex economy to the extent that machines have several non-convex
characteristics. Start up cost and minimal operations levels are two major properties that
invalidate standard convexity assumptions: start up costs need to be incurred before the plant
can operate at any positive level. When operating, this should be above some given percentage
of its rated capacity. Other characteristics such as minimum up and down times add to these
non-convexities. Non-convexities are not amenable increasing marginal cost curves and hence
to the usual increasing supply curves supposed in this paper. The problem is well recognized
and addressed in two dierent ways in restructured electricity systems. One approach, which
is implemented in the Pool systems of the United States, is to allow bidders to communicate
information on start up costs, technical minima, minimal and up and down times to the ISO.
This takes place in the bidding process and inuences its outcome. For given eciently and fuel
cost parameters, being more exible plant is a competitive advantage. The European approach
is dierent; it casts these machine characteristics in modications of the bids. For instance
bidders may require that their machine, if selected, operate for a certain number of hours in
order to recoup the xed start up cost. This gives rise to the bloc bids implemented in both
CWE and the coupling between Denmark and Germany. We do not discuss these matters here.
First, they are non standard in economics and hence would require getting into considerable
additional complications. Second, they are quite often neglected in analysis of market design.
B Nodal pricing model
B.1 Notation
We here list the sets, parameters and variables that are common to all models.
Sets
 l = (1   6);(2   5): Set of lines with limited transmission capacity;
 n = 1;2;3;4;5;6: Nodes
 i(n) = 1;2;4: Subset of production nodes;
30 j(n) = 3;5;6: Subset of consumption nodes.
Parameters
 PTDFl;n: Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) matrix of node n on line l;
  Fl: Limit of ow through lines l = (1   6);(2   5).
Variables
 qn: Power traded (bought or sold) in node n in MWh. These are determined in the market
coupling problem and are taken as data in the counter-trading model.
B.2 Model
The nodal pricing (or owgate) model describes the full integration of the energy and trans-
mission markets into a pool like organization. This is one of the possible formulations of that
problem when one abstracts away from reliability issues. The problem is formulated as a welfare
maximization problem where the energy and transmission markets are coordinated and clear
simultaneously. Congestion costs directly aect electricity prices that in case of a grid satu-
ration dier by node. Because there is currently an attempt to implement such approach in
Europe, we adopt this formulation as reference. The application of the nodal pricing model to
the six node network leads to following formulation where the objective function (1) is subject
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C Market coupling model
Market coupling problem denes the equilibrium on the energy market. We assume that PXs
coordinately operate in the Northern and the Southern zones taking into account a simplied
representation of the grid. This may generate overows that are re-adjusted by TSOs with
counter-trading operations. In our models, counter-trading costs are charged to producers only.
These constitute the link between the PXs and TSOs' problems. The average re-dispatching
costs  are included in the objective function of the PXs' problem as indicates below. We now
present the market coupling problem of the (3-3) and (4-2) market congurations. For a more
detailed discussion of the model see Oggioni et al. [25].
31C.1 Conguration (3-3)
PXs maximize the social welfare under balance and available transmission capacity constraints.
In particular, the objective function (6) includes the average re-dispatching costs  that PXs
charge to generators. We assume that  is proportional to the quantity injected in the energy
market. Note that in the market coupling problem  is considered as a parameter that comes
from the solution of the counter-trading problem. Conditions (7) and (8) are the energy bal-
ances of the Northern and Southern zones respectively. These account for the free variable I
that represents the import/export between the two zones. The shadow variables N;S are the
marginal electricity prices of the two zones. Constraints (9) and (10) respectively impose an
upper and a lower bound I on the ow I. The absolute value of I corresponds to the available
transmission capacity of the zonal interconnecting line. The dual variables 1 and 2 are the












ci()d     (q1 + q2 + q4) (6)
s.t.
q1 + q2   q3   I = 0 (N) (7)
q4   q5   q6 + I = 0 (S) (8)
I   I  0 (1) (9)
I + I  0 (2) (10)
qn  0 8n (11)
C.2 Conguration (4-2)
The comparison with the (3-3) market coupling problem shows that the objective function (12)
is identical to (6), while zonal energy balances (13) and (14) are modied according to the
disposition of the nodes in the (4-2) market organization. Finally, according to our input data,











ci()d     (q1 + q2 + q4) (12)
s.t.
q1 + q2   q3   q6   I = 0 (N) (13)
q4   q5 + I = 0 (S) (14)
I   I  0 (1) (15)
I + I  0 (2) (16)
qn  0 8n (17)
32D Equilibrium computation
Finding the equilibrium means solving a xed point problem where the average re-dispatching
cost is equal to the parameter  used in the formulation of the market coupling model. This
condition links the two models and guarantees that participants in the energy market remunerate
the TSOs for the counter-trading costs that they impose on the grid. We apply a simple
contraction mapping type iterative process in order to nd this . The iterative process starts
with the solution to the market coupling problem without counter-trading as described in Section
6.2 respectively for conguration (3-3) and (4-2).
E Coordinated counter-trading model
The coordinated counter-trading model presented below is suitable for both market congura-
tions. A more in depth discussion of the model is presented in Oggioni et al. [25].
E.1 Notation
We here introduce the counter-trading variables qn that represent the incremental or decre-
mental electricity changes with respect to qn (MWh) that TSON and TSOS require in order to
restore the network feasibility. Note that in all counter-trading problem, TSOs take the power
quantities qn coming from the market coupling problem as given.
E.2 Model
TSOs minimize the global re-dispatching costs stated in the objective function (18). The prob-
lem is subject to the energy balances (19) and (20) that impose that the sum of variations in
production (qi=1;2;4) and consumption (qj=3;5;6) imposed by TSOs equals zero10 and to the
transmission constraints (21) and (22) whose dual variables 

l indicate the marginal values of
the congested lines. By model construction, the two TSOs see identical values for the transmis-
sion lines. Finally, constraints (23) and (24) state that the quantities of electricity demanded
and produced in the Northern and the Southern zones plus the incremental and decremental
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F Un-coordinated counter-trading models
We distinguish three types of un-coordinated counter-trading models that we describe in the
following. For a more detailed discussion of these models see Oggioni et al. [25].
F.1 Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 1
We here denote the counter-trading variables of the Northern and Southern TSOs respectively
as qN
n=1;:::;6 and qS
n=1;:::;6. The formulation of this model is the same for both the (3-3) and
(4-2) market congurations. We present the model solved by each TSO. Note that in this case,
we assume that the two TSOs have full access to all re-dispatching resources.
Problem of TSON
As in the coordinated counter-trading problem, TSON minimizes its re-dispatching costs (25)
accounting for the transmission constraints (28)-(29); the energy variation balance constraints
(26)-(27) and the overall non-negativity constraint (30) on generation and consumption. How-
ever, it also considers the actions of the TSOS as highlighted by the transmission and the
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34Problem of the TSOS
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n) (36)
In this case, the average re-dispatching cost results from the division of the combination of the
total re-dispatching costs of the two TSOs by
P
i=1;2;4 qi.
F.2 Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 2
In this un-coordinated counter-trading model, TSOs have limited access to counter-trading
resources that are not located in their control area. This means that TSON face restrictions in
operating re-dispatch in the Southern zone and conversely for TSOS. Starting from the model
presented in Appendix F.1, this assumption can be easily modelled by adding constraint (37)













n are the bounds, taken in absolute values, on re-dispatching variables
qN;S
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The average re-dispatching cost  is computed as in Appendix F.1.
F.3 Un-coordinated counter-trading Model 3
The third and last un-coordinated counter-trading case assumes that TSOs operate counter-
trading in their control area only. We here present this model for the market conguration
(4-2). For conguration (3-3) see Oggioni et al. [25].
35F.3.1 Problem of TSON
TSON minimizes its total re-dispatching costs (41) considering energy variation balances (42)-
(43), transmission (44)-(45) and non-negativity constraints (46). It operates only in the North-
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F.3.2 Problem of TSOS
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Parallel to the methodology applied in the other sections, the \global" average-dispatching
cost is determined dividing the sum of objective functions (41) and (47) by
P
i=1;2;4 qi.
36G Results of the Un-coordinated counter-trading Model
3 of conguration (4-2)
ATC=39 ATC=400
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) 417.01 infeasible 3,008.64 infeasible
TRC (e) 1,635.11 infeasible 7,628.92 infeasible
ARC (e/MWh) 1.868 infeasible 10.498 infeasible
Net welfare (e) 22,582.990 infeasible 19,991.36 infeasible
MV line (1-6) (e/MWh) 37.99 infeasible 82.30 infeasible
MV line (2-5) (e/MWh) 0.00 infeasible 0.00 infeasible
Table 17: Results of the un-coordinated counter-trading Model 3 with conguration (4-2) when
ATCs equal 39 and 400 MWh and the (1-6) line wedge is 0 e/MWh
ATC=150 ATC=200
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) 569.99 infeasible 1,028.24 infeasible
TRC (e) 3,423.20 infeasible 4,363.902 infeasible
ARC (e/MWh) 4.34 infeasible 5.923 infeasible
Net welfare (e) 22,430.01 infeasible 21,971.76 infeasible
MV line (1-6) (e/MWh) 54.97 infeasible 62.07 infeasible
MV line (2-5) (e/MWh) 0.00 infeasible 0.00 infeasible
Table 18: Results of the un-coordinated counter-trading Model 3 with conguration (4-2) when
ATCs equal 150 and 200 MWh and the (1-6) line wedge is 0 e/MWh
37ATC=39 ATC=400
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) No equilibrium infeasible 3,008.64 infeasible
TRC (e) No equilibrium infeasible 7,628.92 infeasible
ARC (e/MWh) No equilibrium infeasible 10.498 infeasible
Net welfare (e) No equilibrium infeasible 19,991.36 infeasible
MV line (1-6) TSON (e/MWh) No equilibrium infeasible 142.30 infeasible
MV line (2-5) TSON (e/MWh) No equilibrium infeasible 0.00 infeasible
MV line (1-6) TSOS (e/MWh) No equilibrium infeasible 82.30 infeasible
MV line (2-5) TSOS (e/MWh) No equilibrium infeasible 0.00 infeasible
Table 19: Results of the un-coordinated counter-trading Model 3 with conguration (4-2) when
ATCs equal 39 and 400 MWh and the (1-6) line wedge is 60 e/MWh
ATC=150 ATC=200
Prod/Cons Prod Prod/Cons Prod
Welfare loss (e) No equilibrium infeasible 1,028.24 infeasible
TRC (e) No equilibrium infeasible 4,363.90 infeasible
ARC (e/MWh) No equilibrium infeasible 5.92 infeasible
Net welfare No equilibrium infeasible 21,971.76 infeasible
MV line (1-6) TSON (e/MWh) No equilibrium infeasible 62.07 infeasible
MV line (2-5) TSON (e/MWh) No equilibrium infeasible 0.00 infeasible
MV line (1-6) TSOS (e/MWh) No equilibrium infeasible 2.07 infeasible
MV line (2-5) TSOS (e/MWh) No equilibrium infeasible 0.00 infeasible
Table 20: Results of the un-coordinated counter-trading Model 3 with conguration (4-2) when
ATCs equal 150 and 200 MWh and the (1-6) line wedge is 60 e/MWh
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